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1.  Introduct-n
Have private creditors taken into  account the repayment  histories of
developing countries in making them new loans?  Specifically,  were
defaulters penalized  by their  creditors, either in the form of exclusion
from the  market, or by contracting  worse credit terms on new loans?  The
empirical findings in this  paper suggest that the answer is yes: creditors
took into  account default  histories of borrowers and contracted worse credit
terms  on new loans to defaulters.
The question considered,  the relevance  of default histories of
borrowers, is of gteat importance  to understand whether and how banks can
credibly punish badly behaved borrowers, and, thus,  why a country has any
incentive to repay.I  In the recent  body of ever growing theoretical
literature  on international  lending, two distinct,  but not exclusive,
explanations for repayment  of foreign  debt are given.  First, the
reputational  approch, assumes that a debtor's primary incentive to make
repayments is to preserve its reputation as a good borrower (the seminal
paper is Eaton and Gersovitz (1981)2).  The second  approach assumes that the
primary motivation for repayment is the threat of direct sanctions, such as
seizure of overseas assets and trade sanctions, that lenders can impose by
influencing  creditor country legislators (Bulow  and Rogoff (1989  a,b)3).  It
is argued that  having a reputation to pay does not enhance the borrowing
ability of a developing country.
The belief, that primary motivation for repavment is the threat of
direct sanctions, is  based on creditors' legal svstem.  The legal system
typically  gives right to the creditor government to seize a debtor's assets
in the event of a default (enforcing  the right  beyond the juristiction ofthe creditor's go-ernment  requires the c3operation  of another governmen:).
It is,  however,  difficult to justify the levels  of existing debt, which has
an aggregate market value of hundreds of billions of dollars despite the
sizable discounts in the  secondary markets,  with this belief.4  The threat
of seizing  overseas assets will not suffice if the  borrower is a net debtor
and  the  overseas  assets  are  small,  which  currently  is the  case  for  many
debtors.  The threat  of reducing the defaulting  country's gains from trade
is also problematic,  since the creditor  countries stand to lose along with
the  debtor  from  such  an impediment.  Unle3ss  -ceditor  countries  are  willing
to  bear this  cost,  the  banks  threat  to impose  such  sanctions  may  not  be
credible.5  Thus, it  appears, that short  of military interventions to
enforce a debt contract,  which presumably  are a thing of the past, direct
sanctions  are not sufficient.6
The current paper's contribution is a systematic,  empirical
investigation  of the much debated issue  of 'relevance  of past defaults' in
credit  market access.  The findings  are important  for providing validity for
reputational  approach.7  In this paper we investigate  2184 bank loans made
to 70 developing  countries during 1968-1981.  27 of these  countries had
sovereign  borrowing experience during the former  episodes of lending.  The
repayment problems of these  countries pertain to:  1820 through the 1930s
and the post  war (1955-1968)  period.  The primary finding of this paper is
that  countries  with histories of default  were charged higher interest rates
than countries  with no default  history.  Defulaters paid nearly 2-4 percent
more to private creditors for interest  servicing in the 1970s than they
would had they not defaulted  earlier.  Second,  we find that the countries
that a,quired sovereignty recently,  e.g. many African countries, paid higher
spreads than countries that  had bad repayment records.  These findings are3
robust to alternative  speciica Iioons  ot  economic and political
characteristics  of the borrowers, that are errploved  to control for other
determinants  of credit terms.
How and whether banks can credibly  punish defaulting borrowers has vast
welfare and policy implications,  s'evond  its relevance for the current
academic  debate.  Among these implications  are whether borrowers should take
into  account future inability  to borrow in their decision to default, and
whether banks should direct their resources to lobbying  to influence the
creditor  country legal system that makes the imposition  of direct penalties
more effective.  A main policy implication  of our findings, therefore, is
that  boriower country governments  should  be concerned with future
difficulties in accessing credit markets in their decision to default. 8
The findings in this paper are in contrast to those of other empirical
studies  that address the issue,  which differ in terms of their methodologies
and the period of study.  In the first  set of these studies, a period of
stagnation  in lending  following  a period of widespread defaults is
investigated.  The main finding is that borrowers that behaved "well" during
the general  default crisis did not have easier access to credit markets than
others (Eichengreen (1987),  Jorgensen and Sachs (1988),  Lindert (1988)).
The second set of studies analyzed the behaviour in the syndicated loan
market in its expansion stage, the  1970s (Lindert  and Morton (1977), and
Chowdry (1988)).  The conclusions is that defaulters  were not penalized, in
fact it appeared that thev  had better credit terms than  governments with
"unblemished  records".  A discussion of why this paper reaches different
conclusions and what we may learn concerning the long term  behaviour in
these  markets when all the evidence is viewed together, is later provided in
this  paper.r'be  remainder  of  tlic  ri:.,>mi;',d  ,i';  fo11ws  Ill  Section 2 the
e.npirical  method and the  'tie  .:re  !est  ib-d,  Sect  ion  3  contains  the  results
Sectiou,  a  .S  a  discussion  t  :he  resulls and Sect  ioni  5  contains concluding
remarks.
2.  Ezoirical  Issues
2.1.  Methodology
The impact  of a borrower's repavment  history on the credit terms it
later faces in the Eurocurrency  r..arket  is  examined.  In the Eurocurrency
credit market the rate of interest  has two components:  the interbank
interest  rate, which represents  the cost of capital to banks, and the spread
above the interbank rate.  The interbank  interest  rate is excgenous to the
lending decision to specific  borrowers.  Hence, the determination of spreads
will be investigated,  with particular regard to the relevance of repayment
histories.
The relationship  between the spread,  s,  and the probability of
default,  p,  can be posited (see  Feder and Just (1977),  Edwards (1984))  as:
(1)  5  (l-p)
where  0  represents other variables, such as the discount rate that affect
the spread (  For notational convenience the subscripts that would indicate
country- and time-periods  are not employed.).  This equation is easily
justified if perfect competition  and risk  neutral banks are assumed.10
In implementing  this model empirically, consistent  with the convention,
we assume that the functional form of  p  is logistic.  l  Geographic region
dummv variables and time-specific  dummv variables are also employed.  Time-
specific dumm- variables are incorporated  to capture the variations of5
spreads  o-er  time,  and  geo~,tl.iphic  region  dummy variables  are  incorporated  to
capt-re  differences  accross  reo,ions  that  mav not  be  captured  by  the  other
'.'ariaoes  in(orporated  it)  fa;':,  spreads  varied  considerablv  over-time  in
the 197 0s  (Ozler  1990).12
Incorporating  a dummv variable,  D, that is uni y for a country that
had any prior repayment problems  and zero otherwise, the equation we
estimate  (using  ordinary  least  squares  methods) is as follows:
(2)  In s - a0 + Ea.x.  + 2n  6  +  aC  +at+D+w
where
x - a  vector  of  k  variables  relevant  to  the  probability,  p.  A
discussion of of the  variables included  in this  vector will be
provided in the  next  section,
C =  region  specific  dummv variable,
T  time specific  dummv variable.
2.2.  Data
Equation (2) is  estimated, employing  data on commercial bank loans from
Eurocurrency credit markets during the 1970s.  1  Tne  a  contain
information  on the month and the  year of each loan contract  as well as some
characteristics of the contract.  We use LIBOR (London Intetoank  Offer Rate)
as the  base rate, and include  only $U.S.-denominated  loans that  have
variable interest rates  to avoid complications that may arise from
comparisons across different types  of financial  instruments.  After these
restrictions, the data set contains information  on 2184 loans to 70
developing countries for the 1968-81 period.
The 70 countries in  our sample are of three tvpes in terms of their
repav..er.t  histories of sov7"n  -n  debt  The  first rain division is between6
those coutntries  that were so-ereign  in the former episodes of lending and
.hose that  became sovereign in the period followi.ig  World War II, such as
mans African countries.  27  of these 70 countries  have been sovereign in the
former  episodes (1534  loans  out cf 2184 in  our sample) of lending and
therefore  have 'good'  versus 'bad'  repayment  histories.  Repayment histories
of these  countries are summarized  in Table 1.  Defaults on privately held
bonds are considered and are presented for threE episodes:  1820-1899, 1900-
1929 and the 1930s.  In order to  distinguish and investigate the effect of
more recent repayment  problems, an indicator  for problems with privately
held bonds during the 1958-68  period, and an indicator of multilateral
rescheduling  agreements  with official creditors  during the same period are
also emploved.
2.2.a Economic  Determinants  of Spreads
Two types of variables are considered  as possible economic determinants
of the spreads.  First, some characteristics  of the loan contract, second,
borrower characteristics  which are important  in measuring the riskiness of
the borrower are used.
Characteristics  of the loan contract that  are possible determinants of
spreads are: a dummy variable that indicates  whether the borrowing is public
or publicly guaranteed,  a dummy variable that indicates if the loan is
syndicated,  and maturity of the loan.  A possible problem could arise from
the inclusion  of maturity to the extent that  banks determine spread and
maturity simultaneously.  However,  based upon practices in the Eurocurrency
market and the previous literature, loan  maturity is assumed to be
determined prior to the spread determination (Euromoney (1970),  Feder and
Just (1977b),  Edwards,  (1984)).
To capture borrower characteristics,  that are presumably important inmeasuring r_e riskiness  of -le borrower,  we emploved variables that are
similar those  in  previous s-.u(ties  of  crodit terms:  total debt-to-CNP
ratio, debt seryice-to-exparts  ratio, imports  to GNP ratio,  GNP growth.
lagged  value of investment  to  GNP ratio, rate  of  devaluation  and rate of
inflation.1  In addition, the  existence of IMF standby agreemenits  between
1955  dnd our sample perod is considered.  This variable is incorporated as a
measure of economic difficulties  of the recent past, and an earlier
indicator  of recent repayments  problems,  which may not be captured by the
other variabl-s employed. 15
The expected signs of these indicators  have been discussed extensively
in the literature (  for reviews see  McDonough (1982),  Eaton and Taylor
(1986)  and Edwards (1984)),  hence we will only briefly comment on this
issue.  Total debt to GNP ratio is expected to exibit a positive sign, since
it can be considered as an indicator  of solvency for a country.  Liquidity
problems  will be measured  by  the ratio of debt service to exports and the
sign of this coefficient is  expected to be positive.  Reserves to GNP ratio
is an indicator  of the level of International  liquidity  of a country, thus
it is expected to have a negative sign.  Ratio of investment to GNP will be
negatively related to spreads, since it indicates  the prospects of a
countries future growth.  Rat.o of imports to GNP is expected to have a
negrtive coefficient as it  measureF che  vulnerability of the borrower to
trade embargos.  Alternatively positive sign would be expected to the extent
that it measures the vulnerability  of a country to outside shocks.  Higher
rate of growth is argued to result in lower  probability of non-payment.
High inflation is employed as an indicator  of  a larger probability of
balance of payments crisis.  Rate of devaluation is used to measure a
countrv's willingness to use exchange rate adjustments to avoid balance ofpayments  crisis.
As an alternative  empirical specification  of borrowers'
characteristics,  we implemented  a procedure  similar to Ozler and Tabellini
(1990).  For this specification  the  contract level data are aggregeted to
annual level (annual  weighted average of spreads are calculated  where the
weights are the amounts  of Ican contracted for  each contract  within that
year).  Reserves to gdp, and ratio  of exports .o  major creditors as a share
of total exports  are incorporated  to  measure the vulnera.ility of a country
to non-payment  penalties.  Agriculture  as a share  of gdp is used as an
indicator  of  economic  instability  that  affects  a  borrowers  capacity  to  pay.
Real gdp per capita, total  debt to gnp, and presence of IMF stanby
agreements are also incorporated.
2.2.b. Political  Determinants  of Spreads
An important  addition to the set  of economic variables discussed is the
introduction  borrowers' political characteristics.  The theoretical model
considered by Ozler and Tabellini (1990) isolates the discount factor as an
important  parameter in  a country's level of external borrowing.  Previous
work by Alesina and Tabellini (1989),  and Cukierman,  Edwards and Tabellini
(1989)  showed that the size of the discount factor for a country reflects an
important feature  of the  political system: namely, the degree of political
instability,  defined as the probability of imminent  goverment change.
Accordingly, it is important to incorporate such  political factors as
potential determinants of the spreads so as to ensure that the results in
this investigation  are robust to this c-Lsideration.
The measure of political instability  employed here, which is an annual
estimate of probability of government  change, is the same as in  Ozler and
Tabellini (1990),  and similar to that of Cukierman, Edwards and Tabellini9
(1989).  Specifically, the political instability  variable is obtained from a
probit model of government chang-, that uses time-series  ana cross-section
data over the  period of 1955-82.  The specifications  of the probit
regressions  contain three  broad classes  of explanatory  variables: economic
variables designed to measure the recent economic  performe ce of the
government,  political  variables  accounting  for  significant  political  events
that  may signal the imminence  of a crisis, and structural  variables
accounting for institutional  differences  and country specific factors that
do not change or change slowly over-time,  such as the nature of their
political institutions  i.e.  democracies,  democracies in  which the election
date is determined  by a coalition and democracies  ruled by a single
majoritarian par:y.  In addition to the probability  of regime change,
variables that capture the degree of political  polarization have been
considered.  These variables are political  cha.lenges to the regime,  violent
challeni,es  to the regime,  unsucessfull attemps to change the government and
political repre6sions.
3.  Results
3.1  Sample Characteristics
In  what follows the  average spreads in the sample for three country
groupings  will be described.  Overall, these  averages indicate that the
countries that  acquired sovereignty  recently,  were charged  higher rates than
countries that  were sovereign  but had defaulted  on their foreign debt;  the
sovereign countries  with default record,  were charged higher spreads than
the sovereign countries  with no default record.
Countries that  were not sovereign  anytime during 1820-29 or the 1930s
were contracted spreads in the order of 1.28 percentage  points (with  astan(lard  error of . 4d,  whlile  the defau'rers  paid 1.22  percentage points.
'n 'lie  group of coun:ries that  newlv acquired soveriegnitv (43 countries),
African countries (2..  countries) were charged.  the  highest spreads.  The
average spread for the  African countries is 1.41 (with  a standard error of
40)  while it  is 1.20 (with  a standard  error of .49)  for the remaining
countries
Next,  we defined a repayment record  dummy variable as in  Lindert and
Morton (1987) (LD3020 in  Table 2).  For this purpose,  we collected the
countries  that were not sovereign at any time during the period of 1820
through 1930s,  with the countries that  were scvereign  but had no repayment
problems, and assigned zeros to all those  countries  (countries  with
"unblemished  repayment  records").  Countries that were sovereign and had
repayment  problems  were assigned ones.  It is interesting to observe that
when countries are grouped in this way  are the spreads  of  "good" countries
(LD3020 zero)  higher than those  of "bad"  ones.
In contrast to above procedure,  we next look at only the countries that
were sovereign  and compare the mean spreads  of defaulters to those of non-
defaulters,  as they were described for  various historical episodes in Table-
1.  Table 2 indicates  that defaulters paid higher spreads than non-
defaulters for each definition of the dummv  variable.16  (An "F" test
rejects the null hypothesis that the means of the two samples are equal.)
One may suspect that the above results  ar. a consequence of timing of
borrowing for the countires in our sample, since the entry dates of
countries to the market under consideration  differ and that the spreads
varied over-time.  However, the finding that defatilters  paid higher average
spreads than  non-defaulters  hold separatelv for each year of the sample.
For everv vear in the data, the nuil hvpothesis that the means of the twoii
samples  are equal is rejected.
3.2  Estimation  Results
The estimation of equation (2)  yields three important findings
consistent  with the sample averages reported  above:  First, countries that
were sovereign in the former  episodes of lending  were contracted lower
spreads in comparison to the countries that acquired sovreignty recently.
Second,  countries that  were sovereign and defaulted  were charged higher
spreads than  countries that were sovereign  and did not default.  It is
important  to note that more recent defaults are found to have been more
important  in influencing  the spreads: defaults  prior to 1930s did not have
any impact,  defaults of the 1930s,  and repayment  problems of the 1955-1968
period had a significant impact.  Third, defaulters that reneged larger
portions of their  debt were charged  higher spreads than ones that reneged
smaller portions  of their  debt.  Finally, these results are robust to
considering  borrowers' political characteristics  as potential determinants
of spreads.  The results are presented in tables 3-7 as will be discussed
below.  In this discussion the focus  will be on the sovereignty and
repavment  dummy variables (a discussion  of remaining  variables is contained
in the  previous section).
In the first columns of Table 3 and Table 4, the impact of recently
acquired sovereignty is presented by considering  two alternative
specifications  of economic variables.  The dummy variable sovereign, is one
for countries that  were sovereign in the former  episodes of lending and zero
otherwise.  The parameter estimate of this variable is -.13,  and -.16 in
the two alternative specifications  and the associated 't'  values are -3,8and .2  4  respectivelv
In the second column of Table 3 and Table 4,  the impact  of defaults in
the 19Qs  are Presented.  The sample is restricted  onlv to those countries
that were sovereign  borrowers in the  period.  The dummy variable D30 is
estimated to have a positive and statisticallv  significant effect on the
spread (the  coefficient of this  dummy variable is .11,  and .10  in the two
alternative specifications  with respective  t-values of 4.9, and 2.1).
In  Table 5, a summary of estimated  parameter and 't'  values for the
remaining  dummy variables that  were described in tables 1 and 2 are
presented.  The model presented for this estimation is the one of Table 3.
The results indicate first, that the effect of defaults prior to 1930s  were
not statisticaily  significant.  Second, the repayment  problems in the recent
history (post-war -pre 1968  period) are  found to be important.  Finally,
even when we control for the  more recent repayment  problems of the post war
era, dummy  variables defined to incorporate  information  on the repayment
problems of the 1930s are still found to  be significant, though the
parameter estimate is reduced. (This is evident from a specification  which
contains both  OR60 and D3019 dummy variables.)
In order to investigate  the robustness  of our results  we first
conducted influence  diagnostics suggested  by Krasker Kuh and Welch (1983),
so as to ensure that our results  are not driven  by a few influential
observations.  We find that the results are not a consequence of
disproportionately influential  results.  Second,  we have employed
specifications in  which the IMF standby agreement variable is not
incorporated,  'F'  tests support the specifications that incorporate standby
agreement  variable.  As would be expected, specifications that exclude the
standbv agreement variable yield a higher parameter for credit history dummy13
va  r  i  aib  I  e 
'In  Table 6, we present results from  a specification that investigates
the impact of the extent of default.  These results are based on
regressions that  estimate the relation  between the spread on bank loans and
a measure of the cost of former  defaults.  A measure of the cost of default
to the lenders could  be obtained for  a small set of the borrowers in our
sample. Jorgensen and Sachs (1988)  use long-term,  nationally guaranteed  bond
debt issued in dollars and outstanding through the 1930s to estimate the
post-default  present value ratio.  This ratio is  defined as the ratio of
repayments after default to principal outstanding at default, both
discounted to 1931.  The cost of default  measure is available only for 4 of
the countries in our sample and have a total  of 158 observations.1  We
estimated equation (2)  by replacing  the repayment  problem dwimmy  variable
with this measure of cost.  The results indicate that the degree of default
had an impact  on the spreads  charged:  countries  with less costly defaults
paid lower spreads.  The coefficient for the  measure of loss is estimated as
.44  with a "t" value of 3.9.  The beta coefficient for this parameter,
which is estimated as .56 indicates  that a one standard  deviation increase
in the cost of default to the lenders causes the spreads to increase to 1.55
percentage  points from 1.29.18
In Table 7,  we present results from a specification  that incorporates
various  measures of political instabity.  In the first column main
characteristics  of a political system are controlled for by incorporating
various indicators  of political polarization.  The second column, instead,
incorporates  a measure of instability  calculated as the probability of
regime change.  The primarv finding is that the default history indicator,
D3c  at this table, continues be an important  and statistically significant1 4
determinant of spreads.  In both of the specifications  political instability
indicators  are not found to be im'portant  in  determining the spreads.
Overall, our investigation  suggests  that defaulters  were charged higher
spreads than non-defaulters.  How important is the  magnititude of this
penaltv ?  One simple approach to this question is to assume that the spread
penaltv is applied  each year on the servicing of the outstanding long term
debt stock to financial  creditors.  For concreteness  consider the penalty
for defaults of the 1930s.  Our estimations  suggest that the ratio of the
penaltv to interest  pavments,  were near 2-4 percent during the 1970s.19
4.  Discussion
The main finding of this  paper is that defaulters  were penalized by
being charged worse credit terms than non-defaulters.  In contrast, the
established  view appears to be that creditors have paid little attention to
the debt histories of developing  countries, as is evident in recent
citations:
"The empirical case for the pure reputation approach is also weak.
Eichengreen (1987)  and Lindert  and Morton (1987)  both show that,
historically, past repayment records  have had little  bearing on a
countrv's abilitv  to  borrow."  (Bulow  and Rogoff (1989,  p 158,
see also Bulow and Rogoff (1988,  p.18 ) for a similar citation).
"..the  major banks...  did not discriminate  between countries that
had or had not defaulted in the  past, or those that had or had not
required rechedulings  by charging the former  higher premiums."
Schwartz (1989,  p 8-9).
The view that default  historv is  not important  is based on two sets of
studies:  those that investigate  a period of stagna:ion in lending
following a a perird of widespread defaults,  and those that investigate an15
-. p:i  oi  :.  t  age in  1lnding  Th-  ,'osest  studies  to  the  present  one  are
!.Lo:.  of  :..indert  and  Morton  t:X-l  arnd  Chowdrv  (1988),  where  the  authors
:.  o..  ed  the relation  het,teen  hi.  contractual interest  rates  and  the
default.  histories  of borrowers in the former  episodes of lending (1820
through  the 1930s).  The important  similarity  to the present paper is that
both of those studies focus to a period of boom in the financial markets.  A
boom that  was separated from the  previous widespread non-payment crisis by a
period of stagnancy in lending.  Their conclusions  are that defaulters were
not penalized, in fact it appeared that they paid less than  governments
with  "unblemished  records".  Our finding is in  contrast to theirs despite
v.erv  similar  methodology and same  data sources.  The difference, as
demonstrated in this paper, is a consequence  of how  one defines
"unblemished  repayment record".  in their investigations,  countries in the
unblemished record  group contain not only governments  with good repayment
records,  but also governments that  had no record  because they were not
sovereign in the former episodes of lending.
Our result, that creditors paid attention to repayment record of
borrowers, is consistent  with that of Eichengreen and Portes (1989).  The
atlttors,  again, as in this study, investigate  a period of buoyancy (the
1920s)  and  suggest that in pricing of foreign  bonds investors  discriminated
borrowers according to their  past repayment record
The remaining studies that investigated  the impact  of borrowing
experience  on later  market access has a fundamental  difference from the
present one.  Specificallv, thev foc s to a period of stagnancy in private
n.I-:.  g. following a widc-;prca3d  o  is  The overall conclusion of these
sr  :tes  iS  *hat badlv  a (  .l;aved  hoI-  rr  r5  W(ere  not discriminated against;
th.re ... s a rereral  cut:-of' of >  '.r.  and the borrowers that behaved16
'well'  prior to the  widespread crisis, suffered from this as well.  Among
the best known studies, Eichengreen (1987)  analvsed  borrowed amounts by a
cross section  of 32 countries in the first post-war  decade, and found no
apparent relation  between the severity  of interwar  defaults and the ability
to  borrow immediately  after World Wir II.  Jorgensen and Sachs (1988)
focused  on six Latin  American countries and concluded that the non-defaulter
country  of the 1930s (Argentina)  did not have easier credit access during
the 1950-1964  period.  Lindert (1988) investigated  the spreads for 1985 and
suggested  that the spreads in that  year were not affected  by the repayment
problems  of the 1980s.
This evidence suggests that financial  market behaviour differs during
periods of stagnancy  or buoyancy in terms of its tendency to discriminate
among countries according to their  past repayment  record.  During a period
of buoyancy,  when defaults  are isolated  events, the financial  markets appear
to focus on creditworthiness  of particular  countries.  During a period of
widespread repayment  problems,  however, lenders do not seem to pay attention
to creditworthiness  of particular  borrowers. 20
One plausible way of interpreting  these facts is to take an approach
analogous to that  of  Sachs (1983) (a similar idea is also in Krugman
(1985)).  In that framework,  a borrower  with large  outstanding debt to a
large number of small creditors, though fundamentally  healthy, experiences a
liquidity  crisis and is  unable to obtain loans in a competitive equilibrium.
This is because, each individual  bank that  has an upward sloping schedule of
loan supplies to the country,  which is itself a consequence of upward
sloping cost of funds,  develops the expectation that all other banks will
stop lending to that countrv.
Aralogously,  when defaults become frequent  and reach a certain17
threshold  level,  banks mav develop beliefs that all borrower countries will
tail to  make payments leading  to a general  cut-off of lending.  From the
point of view of the borrower countries, the  notion that  banks have
developed  such expectations,  and, therefore,  no new loans  will be
forthcoming  will make generalized  defaults  more likely.  This is because
even solvent  countries  will find it  worth while to default since they  expect
that in the future they  will be penalized  even if they  do not default.
Thus, it is rational for  each bank to stop lending  on the basis of these
expectations.  In addition, the latter  becomes self- confirming, and a
widespread crisis  emerges.  Overall, this  discussion suggests that, except
for a crisis situation  of generalized  defaults,  banks do pay attention the
borrowers reputation  of good or bad behaviour.
5.  Conclusions
This paper investigates  the impact  of historical defaults on terms for
bank loans in developing countries  during 1968-81.  The primary finding is
that those  countries that  had repayment  problems  were charged higher spreads
than  countries that had good repayment record,  during the 1970s.  In
addition,  more recent defaults are found to  have had a more significant
impact:  defults of the 1820-1929  period are not important in the
determination  of spreads, in contrast, defaults  of the 1930s are found to be
significant  determinats of spreads,  and the repayment difficulties of the
1955-68  period have had even a stronger impact on the spreads.
It is interesting that the repayment  behaviour of countries as far back
as the 1930s have mattered, even though they matter less than recent
reschedulings  with government creditors and the IMF stanby agreements, both
of which would be considered  as signs of more recent repayment difficulties.18
:t:t  liN'v  hi !ni!k that  the  nat  urc  (f horrower  government  s  .^nd  ident  i tv  of  the
,-  r  os  wouI  d  have  c hanced (I:  il  h e  surge  of  lending  in  *he  19 70s,  and  t hmi
i:  i  r v  woul  b(  e  forgot el  c- II  n  tlOh  the  governments  may  have  changed
since the 13us,  the different  politicians  may continue to  be the
c-xpressions  of the same social groups or constituencies.  As a consequence
it  is not unreasonable that the creditors  would punish early defaulters as a
deterrent.  As to the creditor country institutions,  it is not clear that
1930s decade is much of a distant history.  A number of institutional
changes concerning  banking in the creditor governments,  such as the deposit
insurance  system,  has been  developed in  response to the crisis of the 1930.
A  second finding  of the present study is that countries that acquired
sovereignty  more recently  paid higher spreads than countries with bad
repayment  records.  A large  number of these  countries are African countries,
and the result continues to hold even after a number of economic and
political factors are controlled for.  This may suggest  a closer
investigation  of what recently acquired sovereignity  captures.  The colonial
history of these countries in relation to their later access to credit
markets should  be considered.
Finally, this investigation  contributes  to the existing literature in
several  wavs, suggesting important  areas of future  work  for a more complete
understanding  of long term behaviour in credi+  markets.  First,  this study
raises the point that finacial  market behaviour may differ during periods o:.
stagnancy  or buoyancy in terms of its tendency to discriminate among
countries  according to their past repavment  record.  Second, the fink..ncial
market's tendencv to focus  oni  creditworthiness  of particular countries may
depend  on whether defaults are isolated  events or are widespread phenomena.FOOTNOTES
'Contract  enforecement problems  are ignored in some studies which
suggest that there should be a greater integration  of world capital markets.
For a survev  of the empirical  evidence on international  capital mobility  see
Obstfeld (1986).
See also Eaton (1989),  Eaton  Gersovitz and Stiglitz (1986), English
and Cole (1987).  Grossman and van Huvk  (1988),  Kletzer and Wright (1990),
and  Manuelli (1986).
3See also Gersovitz (1983)  and Kahn (1984)  in which default leads to
loss of trade.  Sachs and Cohen (1985)  formalize  punishment as a loss to
GNP, which is  discussed to  be a consequence  of both trade and future credit
embargos.
Bulow and Rogoff (1988)  address this problem by separating the  banks
from the rest of the creditor community,  where declaration of default is not
harmfull to the banks.
5For a recent studv of secondary  market price determination see Ozler
and Huizinga (1990).
For details of historical military invasion to enforce debt claims,
"gun-boat technology" see  Winkler (1933),  Borchard and  Wynne (1951) and
Dammers (1984).
-7
'Additional Empirical  support for reputational  approach is in Ozler
(1990).  Evidence  presented in that  work suggest that credit terms in the
1970s were affected by contemporenaous  repayment  behaviour of the borrowers.
8In reality,  whether a government  will, in fact, take such future
penalties into  consideration  will, of course,  be affected  by its
expectations  concerning  staving in power in the future.
Data on fees and commissions  are not available.  Previous studies such
as Feder and Just (1977b)  and Edwards (1984)  also suffer from this
inadequacy.  It is  noted, however, that these costs are low relative to
spreads (see  Edwards p. 728  and Cline pp. 82-83).
10To illustrate this assume that loans are for one period, and  default
means complete loss  of both the  principal and the interest rate.  Let  s -
i-i*  where  i*  is the LIBOR rate and  i  is the interest rate charged to a
countrv.  Then the equilibrium condition is  (l-p) (l+i) - (l+i*),  which
yields equation (1)  where  9 =  (l+i*).  This structure has been implemented
bv Edwards (198-5  TIntroduction  of Tore realistic assumptions yield a
similar  str1c-,ire, foir  ex..l;ple  ,-c-e  Feder  and  Just (1977).2  0
1,
The logistic form is  expressed as
[  k  ) exp  (a~ 0 +  ]  ix
P - ~~~~k
1+ exp  (a+k  x
12~  ~  ~~~~~-
12A cursory  inspection  of the  data  suggests  that  the  cyclical  pattern
of spreads  over time are related to some global and macroeconomic events
such as the oil shocks  and industrialized  country growth rates.  These two
variables are also correlated  with the number of banks that entered the
Eurocurrency  market.  Hence a more sophisticated  approach  would require a
model that employs such variables to explain the spread behaviour over time.
13Loan data for the 1973-81  period are obtained from various issues of
the World Bank's Borrowing in International  CaDital Markets.  The data for
the prior period, however, have been obtained through  an exhaustive search
of the financial  press as well as the central bank reports of the  borrower
countries.  For  more details on this data set see Ozler (1990).
14For reviews  of this literature  see  McDonald (1982)  and Eaton and
Taylor (1986).  The debt-service  ratio, imports to  GNP ratio, imports to
reserves ratio,  GNP growth, and investment  to GNP ratios are among the
variables that are found to  have significant impact on spreads.  The total
debt, and debt service  variables are obtained from the World Bank's World
Debt Tables.  The remaining  vari-ables  are obtained from IMF's International
Financial Statistics.
15Among the 27 countries that were sovereign, the countries that did
not have standby agreements  during the period are Egypt,  Greece, new-
Zealand, Portugal,  Taiwan and Thailand.
16 Since Lindert and Morton (1987)  use the spread data for the 1976-
1980 we have also conducted our investigation  by constaining  our sample
period to 1976-1980.  All the findings continue to hold.
17These countries are Bolivia,  Chile, Colombia and Peru.  The cost of
default for thiese  countries respectively  are: 92%, 69%, 37*, and 61%.
18Beta coefficients are equal to the least squares estimates multiplied
by the ratio of the sample standard  deviations of the independent and
dependent  variables, In other words, beta coefficients are in units of
sample standard deviations.  See  Madalla (1977)  pp.119.19~~~~~~~~~.
s an example  consit  (  ht  i  'y'r  1975,  the total outstanding and
disbursed, public and publiclv  guaranlneed  medium an)d  long term debt of
Bolivia to its financial  creditors  was 211 U.S. $  mill. The average spread
Bolivia paid during 1968-1J81  was 1.90  percentage points.  The parameter
estimate associd,ed for defaults  of the  .930s  is near .11.  suggesting that
Bolivia  would have paid 1.70  percentage  points on avf.rage  had it  not
incurred  this penaltv.  The interest  pavments  on the loans  considered here
was 10 U.S  $  mill. (spreads  are form the Eurocurrency  syndicated loans
described in the  data section  of tthis  piper, and all the remaining  data are
from the World Bank Debt  Tables (1988-89  edition).  Hence the ratio of
renalty to interest  payment for Bolivia  was .042.  Similar calculations for
Peru and Chile in 1975  yield  017 and .024 respectively.
20Ozler(1989) demonstrates  that the impact  of non-payment  difficulties
on the market value of commercial  banks differed when the expansion and
crisis stages  of the recent  episode of bank lending  are compared.P.+  t- f% 
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Countrv  DB  B  OR  B 1q 30  60
Argentina  I  1  0  1  0
Bolivia  1  0  1  0  1
Brazil  1  1  1  1  1
Chile  1  n  1  1  1
Colombia  1  0  1  C  1
Costa Rica  1  0  1  0  1
Ecuador  1  1  1  0  1
Egypt  1  0  0  0  0
El Salvador  1  1  1  0  1
Greece  1  0  1  0  1
Guatemala  1  1  1  0  0
Honduras  1  1  0  0  0
Liberia  1  0  C  1  0
Mexico  1  1  *  0  1
New Zealand  0  0  0  0  0
Nicaragua  1  1  0  0  0
Panama  *  1  0  0
Peru  1  0  1  1  1
Portugal  0  0  0  0  0
South  Africa  0  0  0  0  0
Spain  1  0  0  0  0
Taiwan  1  1  1  0  0
Thailand  0  0  0  0  0
Turkey  I  1  *  1  0
Uruguay  1  0  1  0  1
Venezuela  1  0  0  0  0
Yugoslavia  0  0  1  0  1
(continued)26
Table  1 (cont.)
Notes:
D19:  a dummy variable.  D19 - 1 indicates  that a country has defaulted (or
negotiated at concessionary  terms) on its national privately held
bond debt during 1900-'929.
D20:  a dummy variable defined  as D19 but for the 1820-1929  period.
D30:  a dummy variable defined  as D  1  but for the 1930s.
OR:  a dummy variable,  OR - 1 indica-es  that  a country has rescheduled
its debt to official creditors through  multilateral agreements during
1956-1968.
B60  a dummy variable where B60 - 1 indicates  that a country has defaulted
or continued adjusted servicing  of its  bond debt during the 1958-1967
period.
".":  Panama was not sovereign  during the entire 1820-1929  period, and
there were no private loans to Mexico and Turkey in the 1930s.
Sources:  D 9, D20 and D30 are from Lindert and Morton (1987)
OR is from Hardy (1982)




S.1::iplh  Characteristics  KMtans  and Standard Errors of the Spreads)
'.ariable  nI_  1  Variable  0  1
D19  1  13  1.28  OR  1.12  1.39
(0.44)  (0.49)  (0.44)  (0.50
DI)  1.12  1.21  B  1.11  1.28
20  (0.38)  (0.48)  60 (0.45)  (0.48)
D30 1.08  1.33  AL60 1.09  1.27
(0.44)  (0.47)  (0.44)  (0.48)
D31  1.06  1.28  LD  302  1.25  1.22
D3019  (0.43)  (0.50)  3020  (0.49)  (0.47)
D3020  1.03  1.22
(0.42)  (0.47)
Notes:
Spreads are the spreads on commercial  bank loans from the Eurocurrency
credit markets during 1968-1981.  Only U.S. $  denominated loans with Libor
base rate are included in the sample.
D19,  D30,  OR,  and B60 are defined in Table 1.  The remaining  dummy
variabies are:
D  is one if D  or D  is  one, and zero otherwise.
3019  19  30
D302  is one if  DO  or D30 is one, and zero otherwise.
AL60  is one if  OR or B  6  is one and zero otherwise.
LD  3020:  is  zero if a country  has not defaulted anytime during 1820-1929  or
during the 1930s; in  addition it is zero for countries that were
not sovereign  during the period.  It is one otherwise.LAB_lE  3
impact  ot Sovereignty and Defaults
oras.tm  0.  981  0.317
JiS.5O5)  (2.890)
S;ndicate  -0.006  -0.016
(-0.258)  (-0.561)
Public  -0.131  -0.133
(-7.808)  (-6.841)
Total Debt/GNP  0.915  0.641
(11.745)  (5.204)
Reserves/GNP  -0.048  -0.164
(-3.053)  (-5.670)
Debt Service/Exports  0.004  0.003
(1.034)  (0.851)
IMF Standby  0.050  0.194
(1.977)  (4.673)
Maturitv  0.091  0.086
(24.721)  (18.757)
Investment/GNP  -1.150  -.395
(-8.535)  (-2.083)
Real GNP Growth  0.040  -0.350
(-1.034)  (-2.702)
Imports/GNP  -0.019  -0.164
(-0.644)  (-0.120)
Inflation  0.141  0.474
(1.629)  (3.714)






AdjR2 .40  .48
Nobs  2178  1332
Notes:
Estimated  equation is (2), and the numbers in  parentheses are 't'  values.T. BL!E  '+
imp.ac,  S.)vt.et-ignlty  anld  Dett,u; s
Constant  -2  087  -2.231
,,-12  801)  (-11.932)
Reserves/'GNP  -1.823  -2.438
(-6.064)  (-5.227)
*
Export Ratio  -0.111  -0.385
(-0.762)  (-2.275)
Agriculture/GDP  -0.006  0.002
(-2.090)  (0.060)
Real GDP/Capita  -0.001  -0.001
(-3.431)  (-3.162)
Total Debt/GNP  0.191  0.098
(1.220)  (0.525)
IMF Standby  0.099  0.192
(1.790)  (2.604)
Sovereign  -0.  161
(-2.390)
D30  - 0.101
(2.112)
AdjR 2 .53  .68
Nobs  292  131
Notes:
Estimated  equation is (?)  and the numbers in parenthesis are 't'  values.
The data are annual.30
TABLE 5
Impact  of Alternative Repament  Problems  Variables
Vart-Able  Parameter  Variable  Parameter
_  _t-value)  (t-value)
D19  0 009  OR60 0.161
(0.264)  (5.396)
D  20  -0.026  B60  0.095
(-0.631)  (3.446)
D 30  ~~0.109  AL  60 (2.788)
D30 (4.059)  (2°788)
D  3019  0039327  OR60(.3  0.150
03.0927R 6 (5.000)
(1584)  D3019 (2.275)
Notes:
Results are based on estimation  of equation (2).  Each specification  here
differs only in the definition  of the repaywent  dummy variable employed for
variable D.
*
indicates that  each definition  of the dummy  variable has been included
simultaneously in the equation.
The estimation results for the set of other variables employed in equation
(2)  are presented in Table 3.,11
TABLE 6



























Nobs  - 158  R  0.64
Notes:
Estimated  equation is (2).  where D is replaced  by a measure of cost of
default.  The numbers in the parentheses  are 't'  values32
TABLE 7
Impact  of Defaults
Constanit  -2.353  -2.321
(-11.873)  (-10.305)
Reserves/GNP  -2.409  -2.268
(-5.070)  (-4.071)
Exports Ratio  -0.413  -0.514
(-2.350)  (-1.495)
Agriculture/CDP  0.003  0.008
(0.081)  (0.150)
Real GDP/Capita  -0.001  -0.001
(-3.027)  (-3.203)
Total Debt/GNP  0.131  0.159
(0.690)  (0.660)
IMF Standby  0.214  0.259
(2.788)  (1.362)
Political  Challange  0.001  -
(0.605)
Attempts  0.010  -
(0.222)
Violent Challenge  0.001  -
(0.421)
Repressions  0.001  -
(0.495)
Instability  - -0.167
(-0.147)
D30  0.108  0.100
(2.171)  (2.007)
Adj R2 0.68  0.68
Nobs  131  122
Notes:
Estimated equation is (2).  The numbers in parentheses are 't'  values.
The data are annual for the 'political'  variables.PRE Working Paper Series
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